# FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS

## The Panorama of Warfare in a Nuclear Age

Reprinted by the MILITARY REVIEW from an address by Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery as published in "The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution" (Great Britain) November 1956. Copyright reserved.

WARFARE, especially in a nuclear age, must be prevented if this is humanly possible. Let us start by examining this aspect of the problem.

There are today two great power groups, East and West, and the progress of science will soon enable each to destroy the other. The situation which would permit such frightful consequences must not be allowed to develop.

The political aim of the West must, therefore, be peace, and as things stand today it has got to be peace through strength and strength through unity. But there must be a real determination to protect and maintain our way of life in the face of aggression and, if necessary, we must be prepared to fight for this aim. President Roosevelt once said, "We have nothing to fear but fear itself." Certainly, the surest way to prevent war is not to fear it. Every activity of the western societies should be geared to this aim—peace through strength and strength through unity.

We service people must then be clear about the military object. In my view it can only be to prevent armed conflict. Of course, the aim would change if the circumstances change. For instance, should war be forced on us the aim would be to gain the initial advantage, and finally to survive. Today, firmness in dealing with aggression is vital. Readiness and preparedness are equally vital, in order to gain the initial advantage if we are attacked.

How can we prevent armed conflict? There are three contingencies.

### Unlimited Nuclear War

No side would win this war. It must, therefore, be prevented and that is best done by means of a deterrent.

This should be twofold.

First, the power of instant retaliation by an offensive nuclear capability. This must be built up and maintained at a position from which it could physically destroy an aggressor, in any set of circum-

stances. Some people will say that the H-bomb is the "absolute" weapon and that nuclear war will, therefore, never take place. We cannot say that any particular weapon is "absolute" or that any particular type of war is abolished. Unlimited nuclear war could always happen by miscalculation or irrationalism. But we can say one thing with certainty—it will never be started by the West. Furthermore, if the deterrent is as I have outlined, fully ready to operate at short notice, unlimited nuclear war becomes less likely to be started by any nation.

There is a second prong to the deterrent which will make unlimited nuclear war still more unlikely, and that is the known ability of the Western nations to be able to defend their bases and national territories and to retain freedom to operate in the major oceans and seas.

Probably the most likely source of war today is the entry of eastern land forces into western territories. Such action would spark off a war at once. It can be prevented only by maintaining an interservice shield, maintained in position at all times. The importance of this shield is very great, and it is an essential component of the deterrent against unlimited nuclear war. The presence in the shield of efficient land forces, able to fight effectively without any mobilization procedure, is vital.

### Limited War

I define this as armed conflict other than unlimited nuclear war. Some people think that when East and West have reached parity in nuclear weapons, neither side will use them. They are led to conclude that military aggression with conventional weapons—as for instance in Korea—can be undertaken without fear of nuclear retaliation. My opinion is that it is unlikely that a war as big as that in Korea could be fought again without the use of nuclear weapons. I consider that the West should state publicly that armed aggression against free peoples would be met with instant and adequate retaliation; that would be a risk an aggressor would not care to take.

There is only one way to handle an aggressor who tries to test our firmness in these matters, and that is to oppose limited aggression instantly by strength. I would emphasize the word "instantly." The advantage goes to the other side if you are not ready, and your preparations take time to complete—*whatever may be the type of war.*

### Cold War

I define this as measures, short of armed conflict, which are used in the battle of wits between East and West.

If our strategy prevents global nuclear war, and provides means to deal *instantly* with lesser conflicts, it places a powerful weapon in the hands of our political masters. They will be negotiating from a position of strength, not unilateral or national strength, but from a stronger source, derived from the voluntary association of peoples bound by a common cause.

Over-all, it is my opinion that as things stand today we have in NATO the best organization for winning the cold war, and for ensuring that it does not develop into limited or unlimited war. If we use NATO wisely, and strengthen it politically, always keeping in mind our political aim of peace through strength and strength through unity, then the danger of unlimited nuclear war will become steadily diminishing.

### If War Should Come

Now we must pass on and consider the problem that would arise if war should be forced on us, in spite of all our endeavors to prevent it. Service chiefs and their political masters are collectively responsible for reaching decisions about the pattern of future war, so that organization and training can proceed on the right lines. We do not seem to make great progress in this respect. The tendency is to discuss the opening phases; we neglect

the whole pattern. Perhaps we service chiefs are to blame.

The advent of the nuclear weapon demands a new conception of war, a full conception. I do not suggest that there will be any changes in the principles of war, but there will be fundamental changes in the way these principles are applied.

I propose that we should now peer into the future and have a look at unlimited nuclear war. We will best do this by placing ourselves at a vantage point from which we can survey the whole panorama. And, to get a balanced view, let us insulate our minds against the day-to-day pressures and influences which obscure clear thinking. This is not easy. But we can try, and I will give a lead. Time does not allow me to discuss limited war or cold war.

To get a firm background for our survey, I suggest we consider an imaginary war between two powerful groups of nations. We will call them East and West, and we will include the NATO nations in the West. And let us look back on the conflict, rather than forward to it as is the normal custom.

I propose now to turn myself into a historian. And I will address you from a position in time three years after such a global conflict, which occurred in an age of nuclear plenty for both sides and at a time when short- and long-range missiles were available as vehicles of firepower in addition to manned aircraft. The war began in 1966. The East was the aggressor. It is now 1969. Looking back at that war, I saw the pattern clearly, and it was obvious to me that the West survived only because it began to do certain sensible things in 1956—which we have not done yet.

### The Phases of the War

I saw that there had been three distinct phases in the war:

Phase I—the Destructive Phase.
Phase II—the Exploitation Phase.
Phase III—the Reconstruction Phase.

### Phase I: The Destructive Phase

In the initial phase of the war a large number of nuclear weapons were delivered by the manned aircraft and missiles of both sides. The destruction caused to life and property was great. I saw that the West gained an advantage in the initial exchange for two reasons.

*First*, great effort had been devoted to developing the Western intelligence organization and early warning systems. The West got warning of the attack and the initiative was regained in a matter of hours. The West could not have done this in 1956. At that time the intelligence machine was underdeveloped; the scientists had received insufficient direction, and their contribution to the field of intelligence had been largely untapped.

*Second*, the West had released their air and missile forces from the bondage of decentralization. Under central control the air forces of the Western nations had been welded into one mighty weapon; this weapon crippled the East's ability to deliver nuclear weapons very soon after she began to dispatch them. Until the Western nations brought their air forces under central control they did not realize what immense economies, saving of effort, and standardization were possible. For far less expenditure of wealth and effort, a far more efficient and powerful weapon was created; this weapon could be applied instantly to any target system in the world.

In the field of air defense the West had also made great strides. Starting in 1956, a realization that the air battle could not be divided in neat watertight compartments of offense and defense had led to the unification of the many air defense systems previously in being. Only by doing this were the Western nations able to get a unified policy and to develop the very expensive equipments necessary for modern war.

These then are the first two things I would tell our political masters today:

1. We need better intelligence, far better.

2. The West needs centralized control of its air and missile forces.

But let us return to my imaginary war.

On land, the Eastern armies advanced to contact on all fronts. But interdiction and nuclear "fallout" made all movement slow and costly. The ground fighting which followed contact was in many ways similar to previous wars. I noticed, however, two important points of difference.

*First*, the Western air forces played little part in the land battle in forward areas.

*Secondly*, the ground actions proceeded more slowly than had been expected, and certainly much more slowly than they had in the war of 1939-45.

These two points interested me and I examined them closely.

### Air Forces

To take the air first. The East entered the war with powerful tactical air armies, the primary task of which was to support the land armies and, to a lesser degree, her naval forces. These tactical air forces gave this support for about four days. Thereafter, although they had nuclear and conventional weapons in numbers, they were unable to deliver them with piloted aircraft; the West had so disorganized the Eastern control system, and so destroyed their static airbase system, that the East could not sustain the operations of her tactical air forces.

The West, on the other hand, entered the war with *no* tactical air forces of the type they had developed in the 1940's and 1950's. They realized in good time that piloted aircraft with nuclear weapons were *not* the sole or even the main instruments with which to give close support to the land armies. The reason was twofold.

First, it was realized that the objectives of the land battle were no longer those of the 1939-45 war. The object in the land battle in a nuclear age is no longer to capture your enemy; it is to destroy him with atomic weapons.

And secondly, the communication system would be so badly damaged in the early exchange of nuclear weapons that it would not be capable of relaying the target detail in time—if at all.

The West had decided, therefore, that land armies must have their own organic atomic firepower on a scale which would enable them to destroy any enemy which managed to get into close contact. The air forces were to be used on the deeper interdiction and armed reconnaissance, which could to a large degree be preplanned and, more important, could be executed even if higher control were lacking.

This then is the next thing I would tell our political masters today.

Air forces are not the weapon on which the land armies should depend for their main support. They are *admirable* weapons for the deeper indirect support which I have already described. Instead, therefore, of wasting effort on developing tactical air forces to support the land armies, with the communication systems and operating procedures to provide close support, we should devote this effort to provide the weapons the army really needs, that is short-range missiles, and guns and howitzers, with small-yield atomic heads.

These weapons must be designed to handle all likely ground targets which have a direct influence on the land battle. For this purpose a "family" of weapons should be developed, having ranges varying from a few hundred yards up to the maximum range of the short-range missile. These weapons should be of a very simple type, easy to move and operate.

The army must be able to do something which has never been done in history, except by Genghis Khan. The "Small Bat-

talions" must be able to defeat the "Large Battalions." Air forces will play a part in this, but not in the forward battle area; they are not the right weapon.

Reconnaissance and intelligence, of course, the armies will still need, and the air forces must supply a great deal of this.

### Land Forces

I saw that in Europe during this imaginary war that the function of land forces was "to hold." There were two main reasons.

First, it was the nuclear weapons of the deterrent forces, with their delivery systems, which contributed most to the offensive punch. Their function was to destroy, and the principle of economy of effort made it wasteful to launch land forces in addition.

Second, the land forces did not have to do more than hold and survive—nor could they have done so, because of the nuclear weapons *used against them by the enemy.*

I said just now that the ground actions had proceeded more slowly than expected. Why was that?

There were three main reasons.

*First, the human mind.* Every man on the battlefield in the early days heard and saw the effects of very many nuclear explosions, some far away, some very close. The effect was definite and marked. From the highest headquarters to the soldier on the battlefront, the human mind was so psychologically shocked that its efficiency deteriorated to a degree in which reactions were slow.

*Secondly,* the damage to communications, particularly at the higher echelons, prevented control, sometimes for long periods. Enemy jamming also interfered with control by wireless at all echelons.

*Thirdly,* the movement of formations was slowed by large areas of nuclear "fallout," and by millions of refugees on the roads. I noticed that the plans of the West to deal with the refugee problem were not adequate.

From studying these imaginary events we can see emerging the pattern of our ground forces of the future. Powerful, compact fighting divisions of all arms are what we need for unlimited nuclear war, capable of sustained fighting without reinforcement. The system of control within the corps must be simple, and should it break down, the divisions must still be able to fight. The corps will contain three or four of these powerful divisions. A corps must be able to fight without the interlocking support of other corps.

Divisions need their own nuclear artillery and short-range missiles.

### Sea Forces

I then examined the war at sea. I saw that during the alert period which good intelligence had given the West, the fleets and task forces had been at sea. The long-range submarines of the East had also put to sea, but some of them had been detected and these were shadowed by Western forces until H-hour, when many of them were destroyed. The bulk of the Eastern submarine fleet never got to the focal shipping areas; they were detected, hunted, and destroyed on their way there and near their home waters.

The Western fleets in the main survived the initial exchanges of nuclear weapons and were, as a result, able to deliver great offensive firepower against sea, land, and air targets.

How were the navies able to do these things?

*First,* much scientific effort and money had been devoted to methods of detecting underwater craft *at long range.* These devices neutralized the advantages so long possessed by the submarine.

*Second,* the Western fleets had also provided themselves with large numbers of surface and underwater vessels, which could launch nuclear missiles. I will not

attempt to give these vessels names except to say that they were *not called aircraft carriers*. Most of the larger vessels were, however, equipped with vertical takeoff reconnaissance aircraft.

The Easterners, who had never really understood naval power, were completely outwitted. They had, since 1945, placed much faith in their great submarine fleet, admirable tactics for the 1950's, but outmoded thereafter. They had fallen into the error of building for the next war in terms of the last—an error common to military men. Their great submarine fleet had no significant effect on the war at sea in Phase I—the Destructive Phase.

What can we learn from the naval operations in the war in 1966?

One thing predominates. The supremacy of the submarine *must* be eclipsed, because, as you will see when we examine Phase II, we shall need our naval power and merchant ships later. Seapower is very important to our success in the later phases.

Can we today say that we have mastered the submarine? Can we honestly say that we are devoting sufficient scientific and financial effort to developing means of doing so? I think the answer to both these questions is "NO." I know advances are being made, but not quickly enough; much greater effort is required.

### Survival

That is how Phase I ended; it was suitably called the Destructive Phase. Before we go on I will summarize what we must have today as a minimum, if we are to survive the early stages of Phase I of unlimited nuclear war on a global scale.

*First.*—We must have far better intelligence than we have at present, to give us warning and to acquire targets.

*Second.*—The West needs to bring its air and missile force under appropriate centralized control, in order to destroy an enemy war machine and to defend our own.

*Third.*—We need powerful and efficient land forces, armed with suitable nuclear weapons which are mobile and easy to handle.

*Fourth.*—We need reliable equipment for detecting underwater vessels at long range.

*Fifth.*—We need fleets of surface and underwater missile firing ships. In other words, means of delivering great firepower from mobile bases.

### Phase I Continued

I saw that during this phase other events occurred from which we can learn a great deal. Mobilization of reserve forces did NOT take place to any great extent in those Western countries which had been heavily bombarded with nuclear weapons. During the first two weeks a few formations were brought up to strength on a regional basis and moved to the battle area.

In fact, the armies which were "in being" in peacetime, and prestocked, had to do most of the fighting; they were not reinforced to any great degree.

I do not believe the present complicated mobilization machinery of the NATO countries will ever work under conditions of nuclear war. This subject needs intensive study.

The lesson is that the land forces which are deployed in peacetime to protect the territories of the Western nations must be kept up to strength, fully equipped, and prestocked. The shield must be firm, and able to handle a hard blow, thus gaining time for the retaliatory forces of the deterrent to come into action.

### End of Fighting

When Phase I ended, there was no Eastern government or high military authority which could be found. By D plus 20 it was quite clear that, except for the arrival of occasional missiles with conventional warheads, the Eastern air forces were destroyed.

By D plus 25 the Eastern armies in contact were running out of fuel and ammunition; their casualties, which had been enormous, had not been evacuated or treated, and in many cases formations lacked control above regimental level. There were no coordinated land operations anywhere after D plus 30.

Between D plus 30 and 50, the remaining Eastern surface vessels and submarines had been eliminated.

That is how the fighting stopped, but it was not the end of the war; it was only the beginning.

**Phase II: The Exploitation Phase**

Great destruction and chaos were caused in Phase I. If the Easterners were in a bad way the Western allies were little better, except possibly in one or two respects.

The Western air forces retained a number of piloted aircraft and missiles, and there were still some nuclear warheads left.

The Western armies, like the Eastern land forces, had suffered very severe casualties and were not capable of movement to any great degree. The railways and the major road systems were severely damaged.

The Western navies had had casualties; but in comparison with the other armed forces of both sides, they were intact, powerful, and capable of further action. This was the situation which faced the Western nations on about D plus 45. How were they to survive? I saw that the Western leaders decided to do three things, and to do them quickly.

They were:

*First.*—Start reconstruction of society, industry, and government.

*Second.*—Counter any spread of communism which might arise from the wholesale misery and chaos that had been created.

*Third.*—Remove from the East her remaining nuclear capability and potential.

I saw that the West undertook these tasks in the second phase in the following way.

The Western nations considered that if they were to survive, the strength that remained to them must first and immediately be directed to the reconstruction of their own societies. *If further heavy military commitments were undertaken, the nations would become so weak that Western civilization would decay and disappear.*

There could be no question of taking thousands of Eastern prisoners or of attempting any large-scale disarmament of the East; the effort would be crippling. The Western nations could not feed and administer themselves, and they could certainly not expend any great effort on their enemy. *There was no question of occupation of Eastern territory in any form.*

What remained of the Western armies slowly advanced to the frontier of Eastland, driving the enemy units before them, using force where necessary. In fact, they needed very little persuasion. Those units which could be disarmed easily were, of course, disarmed. Those units which still had a degree of cohesion and control were ordered to march East; if they refused they were attacked with nuclear weapons. On the frontier of Eastland the West established a defensive belt, with light forces supported by nuclear weapons, having freed all satellite nations that Eastland had annexed in previous wars. No Western armies entered Eastland: no armies of occupation. Search parties yes, but no occupying forces.

The Western navies with the amphibious forces, including long-range penetration forces, established bridgeheads in Eastland. Some airfields were rehabilitated slowly. Transport, strike, and reconnaissance aircraft were flown in and the search was begun for the remaining nuclear effort, for the scientists, and for the techni-

cians. In some cases Eastland armed forces opposed this search and it was necessary for the Western forces to use nuclear weapons to enforce their will; but usually the threat of bombardment was sufficient to quell resistance.

Eventually, the commanders in charge of these operations reported that the task was as complete as it ever would be. All Western forces and civil personnel were then withdrawn from Eastland. It took the West about *two years* to complete this task.

By far the most difficult task confronting the allies in Phase II was to stop the spread of communism. The chaos and misery which had been caused provided fertile soil for that disease.

### Phase III: The Reconstruction Phase

It took a very long time to rebuild the economy and society of the democratic world after such a war. The extensive use of nuclear material to produce power in all its forms would have reduced the length of this reconstruction period. The lesson for us today is that great advances will have to be made in the techniques for doing this, and in the methods of applying these techniques easily and quickly to the needs of industry and of society.

I have now given you a panorama of warfare in a nuclear age, some of the things we need, and some of the things we must do to ensure the survival of our Western way of life.

### Logistics

You will have noticed that I have not yet mentioned logistics. The reason is that I found it quite impossible to visualize a war of the future being supported by our present logistic system.

It is time that we looked at this problem more realistically. Wherever I go I hear people say we want more of this and more of that.

We shall NOT get any more. We have a vast complicated organization for the distribution of material all over the world. Hundreds of committees in peacetime, and even more in war, receive millions of reports and issue thousands of instructions every day; no communication system will ever carry the load. Anybody who thinks the present system will work after thousands of nuclear weapons have been exchanged is mad. After the first nuclear exchange, nothing of any size or quantity will move on land in the areas in which these weapons have exploded or are exploding. *Perhaps at sea alone may surface movement on any scale be possible.* Hence the importance of seapower; it will be needed in Phases II and III.

There is not time to develop this subject further. It is sufficient to say that the most intensive study is essential in order to get us out of the logistic morass in which we are floundering.

I have tried to answer the challenge of the politicians and of the scientists:

What will war look like? and, In what direction should our efforts be directed?

I now propose to suggest how we should set about getting some of the things we need.

### The Master Global Plan

The first thing we must do is to make a master global plan for the fight against communism. But we cannot make such a plan without a Supreme Authority for the direction of political policy and military strategy. The West is trying to fight communism; this is a global struggle and we must have a global plan. There is no global plan.

The Supreme Authority is needed *now* to make the master plans and to prepare all the Western nations for what might come, to tell them what parts they should play. They might not wish to play their parts, but that is another matter; at least they should be told; the responsibility for noncooperation will then be on their shoulders.

I have tried to tell you what I think the breadth and scope of these master plans should be. They must be based on the political association and aims of the West. What are our long-term political aims? We have none. What is the use of working for economic integration or of building up military strength, if the Western nations have not first agreed their political association and long-term aims?

### Scientific Development

Here lies the key to saving money and applying it to the best effect.

But it is necessary to take risks—justifiable risks. We know by now what we need in the future, or we should know. We also have a good idea of what the future holds; the scientists have told us. There are many things we need, as, for instance, ballistic and guided missiles, vertical takeoff aircraft, nuclear powered navies, special fuels of high energy for everyday military use, small-yield nuclear weapons for the armies, and other things that I have already mentioned. They are all scientific possibilities, but it will be a long time before we have them in quantity.

### The Missile Age

We must have a plan for the development of our forces as we move toward the missile age. That plan must be based on certain fundamental factors, some of which, in my opinion, are as follows:

1. By 1966 we will have seen the start of the transition to the period of the missile, and we will have begun to use the nuclear warhead for our firepower. From that time on, we may expect increasingly rapid progress in this direction until other means of delivery and other forms of firepower become the exception rather than the rule—at any rate in unlimited nuclear war.

2. Manned aircraft will not go completely out of business for a very long time, so far as can be foreseen. For example, they will be needed for reconnaissance and for certain tactical tasks, since it is not possible to devise a machine which can deal with the unexpected; the human brain is required for that.

Also, a highly efficient strategic bomber force will always be required in the foreseeable future because of the great difficulty in getting the exact locations of interior targets in enemy territory. Furthermore, manned aircraft will be needed in limited warfare in undeveloped countries, and for cold war activities. And they will certainly be needed for transport purposes so as to give greater flexibility to armed forces generally.

3. In the not too distant future we will reach the stage where almost any amount of destructive force will be able to be dispatched from any point, to objectives at any range from zero miles to more than 5,000 miles distance. In fact, we can say that we are almost in that position today. Therefore, the interests of efficiency and economy will dictate modifications in our organization. Integration of control will be absolutely essential to the efficient accomplishment of military tasks. Theoretically, the ideal solution would be to combine all military functions into a single service, not by any blitz methods of attack but by a gradual process. But today this would not be possible. This is a pity as such a change would make the problem so much easier. There is today great duplication and great waste in service affairs; interservice rivalries and mistrust still distort our judgment and make sound decisions impossible.

This might be the ultimate solution but, whether or not we go this far, the barriers that now exist between services and their functions must give way. The independence that characterizes our service relationship today must yield in favor of interdependence.

4. In spite of aircraft of ever-increas-

ing capabilities, and in spite of the advent of guided and ballistic missiles, *there is still a need for well-organized and highly trained ground forces. They are vital to our strategy.* The concept of massed armies is a thing of the past. But we must have an effective shield on the ground, with an integrated atomic capability.

Nothing that has yet been seen or envisaged in the field of new weapons can replace the need for men on the ground actually holding territory which, without their presence, would certainly fall into enemy hands in war.

5. A major problem will be to devise a system by which national armies will be suitable for cold or limited war, *and also* for unlimited nuclear war on a global scale. For limited and cold wars, divisions need an offensive capability and light equipment. For unlimited nuclear war, divisions require a defensive capability with suitable nuclear weapons.

Nations with overseas commitments which might lead to limited war require some divisions to be located in the home country; these must be lightly equipped and the means must exist to transport them by air instantly to troubled areas. Other divisions may have to be deployed in areas in which only unlimited nuclear war is likely. In fact, nations with such dual problems need flexibility above all, so that the problems can be solved within the limits of financial possibilities.

To reconcile all these differing requirements within the field of practical realities will not be easy—but it must be done. *We should realize that as unlimited nuclear war becomes less likely, so limited wars and cold war activities will become more likely.*

6. The proper organization of manpower is of tremendous importance, in order to give confidence to the regular soldier, sailor, or airman that his future will be safeguarded.

In a world war the whole nation is mobilized and everything gives way to the fight for survival; there is no problem here.

But in limited or smaller contests the disturbance to the life of the nation should be as little as possible. At present, when some trouble arises, a "stop" is at once put on all regular personnel leaving the services. This makes it difficult for the regular who has made all his plans for retirement and has a job waiting for him. It is an irritant which has a most adverse effect on recruiting. The subject needs urgent study.

An organization is required which will enable the nation to take limited wars, or cold war activities, in its stride—without upsetting the planned lives of a valuable section of the community.

### Civilian Morale

The secret of civilian morale under attack, as of military morale, is that the people should be told the truth about what is happening and should believe the situation to be under control. They must receive regular information and they must be told what to do. None of these things will happen unless full preparations have been made in peacetime.

They are not being made.

It is vital to understand that in a situation of nuclear equality between two sides, each of which has the most modern means of delivery, that side will survive which has the best organized homefront. The crucial problem will be the defense of home morale—not only the attack on enemy morale. Home morale is the business of Civil Defense. Civil Defense is vital to the modern fighting chief, because without it his base is not secure.

The political leader must be able to speak to the people. Newspapers must continue to circulate. It is relevant to ask a few simple questions:

*Are there plans for moving broadcasting equipment and personnel to a reason-*

*ably safe place whence they could carry on their work during and after nuclear attack? Has the use of ships been considered?*

*Are there Western plans to ensure that if the broadcasting system of one or two nations is knocked out, other stations could carry on by taking over their wavelengths and providing a skeleton service?*

*Have the leading newspapers of each Western country been asked to prepare a war plan which would enable a small team with special equipment to produce a minimum national newspaper, or regional newspapers, under war conditions?*

Many other such questions could be asked.

The above questions explain themselves. The answer to them is "No."

Therefore, our preparations for the maintenance of civilian morale in nuclear war are totally inadequate.

### The Outstanding Points

Another world war in a nuclear age would be a most devastating affair. We fighting men are often accused of liking war; in fact, we are the people who dislike it most because we know too well what it means to humanity. But we have to plan for war, and be ready should it be forced on us by some evil man, or evil group of men who seize power and attempt to exert their will by force. Only in this way can we survive if attacked.

From lessons learned herein it is obvious that we must do everything possible to prevent a war from taking place; it would be suicidal for both sides.

We will not get peace by threatening war. But in the modern world peace can be assured only by military strength; this may be sad, but it is a fact. Therefore, we must maintain such a position of strength as will make an act of aggression very very expensive for the aggressor. Only in this way can we be assured of maintaining our objective of peace, *at present.*

Next, we are faced with a difficult problem to get the over-all military strength we need, and to get it within the limits of financial possibilities. It is vital that we in the fighting services should not blindfold ourselves with service partisanship, with outdated concepts, or allow our thinking to become shackled by doctrine and tradition.

The technological race with other nations is not the only problem. There is also the problem of organizing our defenses so that we may use the new weapons most effectively. Weapons usually outstrip strategy and tactics; the gap today is bigger than ever before.

The trend in service organizations today is toward service self-sufficiency. If we are not careful, we will have three independent self-sufficient Ministries of Defense. That is what would happen if each service was to have *all* the forces, and *all* the weapons, and *all* the equipment necessary to meet *all* its threats.

We must adopt a different approach to the defense problem; we must study it in a spirit of investigation and honest searching for the truth. We must remember that in a future war the decision will come to the side which can take the appropriate initial action very quickly, and which best uses its weapons from the outset; the decision will come too quickly to learn lessons and make changes.

In line with this thinking, it is time we took a new look at the jobs to be done, and the forces and weapons with which to do them. We must get busy *now*—before it is too late.

Since a lot of service controversy results from competition for the most important tasks, perhaps the roles and the missions in force today need revision. If so, let's do it.

Let us look at some other measures that might help us solve the problem. The idea of a single service has been suggested many times. Personally I favor it. But it

would not be accepted today. However, if we have another world war, I believe we would end up with a single service—or two services, the Quick and the Dead.

Then there is unified command. I favor this philosophy. It would help if we could get the men of all the services to identify themselves more as members of a mission, and less by the color of their uniforms.

To get better integrated commands we need more well-rounded staff officers to man them—officers who have a working knowledge of *all* the services. This, in turn, would require a more comprehensive, unified system of military education. Learning about all the services must start sooner—when an officer is commissioned, or even before. Today, many officers reach the equivalent rank of major before coming into contact with other services.

But the main need is to get the real truth about defense—the kind of defense we must have. If the truth shows we need a new organization, let's have it. Or if we need a new reorganization, let's do it. If realignment of roles and missions is necessary, let's do it.

I suggest that the proper way to tackle the problem is to think out and decide what the defense organization should be in 10 years' time.

We should then work toward it slowly, ensuring that each step taken is an advance toward the achievement of the long term objective. Who is doing this thinking today? For instance, in 10 years' time (in the missile age) do you see a very large Admiralty, a very large War Office, and a very large Air Ministry—in addition to a Ministry of Defense? Personally I don't.

The whole of our defense organization needs to be examined closely, working up to a Minister of Defense who has full responsibility and the power of decision.

### Conclusion

I suggest you get a better approach to this subject in the way I have used—by looking back upon rather than forward to a conflict.

We have seen the need for planning and for approaching our problems of today realistically. It is probably a matter of opinion whether the main blow in future war will be delivered by the manned aircraft, supplemented by guided missiles, or the reverse. My own opinion is that by 1966 over 50 percent of the strategic tasks will be performed by missiles. As regards tactical air forces for the support of land armies—I consider that by 1966 about 75 percent of the present type will have been replaced by nuclear weapons in the hands of the land forces.

It is vital to understand that global warfare in a nuclear age will *not* be similar to the 1939-45 war, with the only difference that there will be bigger "bangs" and noises. Instead, it demands a complete overhaul of our strategical and tactical conceptions. Having grasped this basic and fundamental factor, it is then necessary to tackle the problem with imagination and realism and to bring into focus some of the greatest needs of our times—that is, intelligence, scientific development, plans, and, so far as we can achieve it, central control of some of our forces. It also demands an overhaul of the defense organization.

In this respect many points emerge from the picture I have tried to unfold before you.

One is that it will become increasingly difficult to define the tasks of each fighting service, or allot tasks by functions. We must try and move toward a greater unification of the services than we have today.

A second point concerns movement. It is clear that as time goes on, movement of any degree in unlimited nuclear war will be possible only in the air and on the sea. Movement by air is well understood and accepted; more and more must this be used to increase the strategic mobility of armed forces generally.

We must now exploit the sea in the search for mobility. A study of a global map shows at once the enormous advantage conferred on the side which has freedom of movement across the water areas of the world. On the seas the effect of "fallout" is not a serious factor and will not prevent movement.

Fixed nuclear launching sites on land will be vulnerable; on the seas all launching sites can be mobile and these will not be easy to locate and destroy.

The longer I study this problem, the more I reach the conclusion that airpower and seapower will provide the main offensive punch in unlimited nuclear war of the future. And their offensive power must, and can, be mobile. Landpower will be essential as a direct "stop" on the ground in order to protect our territories and peoples. But the strategy of those who fight on land will be defensive, since any considerable movement will not be possible.

The sea must be exploited increasingly to give surface strategical mobility and to provide mobile launching sites for nuclear weapons.

I believe the situation today is critical. Either we plan realistically for the future, and survive in a nuclear war—or we drift along, planning from year to year and using *ad hoc* methods, and end in disaster.

You may not agree with one word of what I have said. But that is not the point. If you do disagree, disagree constructively: go one better than I have.

So far we have heard nothing on this subject from any political or military chief in the Western World. If nothing is said, nothing will be done, and no plans will be made. We will then face the East with an archaic war machine, unformed ideas, and in a political muddle.

I have at least said something.

The future of Western civilization will depend on whether we tackle this problem with imagination and with realism—not tomorrow, but *now*.

**Finally**

In this address I have talked about war —nuclear war.

But it is my definite belief that if we take a good look at things *now*, and do the things we reasonably should, we will be able to look forward to many years of peace—with *no* nuclear war. But one thing is essential—the nations of the free world must live up to their motto:

Peace through strength
and
Strength through unity

The emphasis must be on the word "unity."

In a nuclear age, national wars are things of the past. No nation can do without allies; these may at times be irritating, but they are necessary. The trouble is that nobody seems clear about how to get the unity and unselfish solidarity which is vital if we are to oppose a strong front to the onward march of communism.

The source of inspiration in the free world should be like a lake of pure water, from which pipes carry the political policy and strategical guidance to the nations. But instead of this "Lake of Unity," we have about 30 political puddles.

What is needed today is a united Western Europe within the Atlantic Alliance, with a clearly defined political association. We can, of course, build up military strength, and defeat the East in battle. But what good will this do if, having survived the war, we lose the West to communism? The struggle between East and West is a struggle for the hearts and minds of men. In fact, it is *more* a political problem than a military one. But we tend to neglect the political problem, and to concentrate on the military approach. Both are essential. But the political problem must be solved first; and it will never be solved as long as the nations swim about, each in its own political puddle. The broad "Lake of Unity" is vital to the free world.

We have a long way to go before we can say that there is true unity among the nations of the West. True unity implies a willingness to make sacrifices for the common good; we do not see enough of this willingness today.

I often think that we service chiefs could do more to help than we do. Are not some of us too national in our outlook? Do we try and look at the world problems through international spectacles?

The best way to do all these things is to line up solidly behind NATO and to strengthen that organization politically and militarily. NATO must be kept viable and effective; we must redouble our efforts to keep it so.

I said at the beginning of this talk that our aim is peace. The surest road to peace is to hold fast to NATO, and to dedicate ourselves to its beliefs and principles; if we follow this road, we and our children may look to the future with confidence.

---

# An Effective Counterguerrilla Procedure

**Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Captain André Souyris in "Revue de Defense Nationale" (France) June 1956.**

DURING the early post World War II period in Cambodia, an instability of government due to violent internal dissentions and growing insecurity on the frontiers presaged general anarchy—a bad outlook for the future.

Today, far from showing signs of imminent decadence, a new Cambodia assumes an increasingly important place in southeastern Asia.

This change was effected by means of a regroupment of the populations which permitted including the inhabitants in a system of self-defense. This procedure proved its effectiveness in the fight against subversion, which had won over the majority of the Cambodian population.

## 1951-52

During the years of 1951-52 the methodical action undertaken by the Vietminh and its accomplices was increasingly successful throughout Cambodia. The rebellious territorial organization enjoyed popular support and, in spite of all the efforts undertaken against them, held governmental authority in check.

In conformity with the principles of revolutionary war, the action of the rebels was aimed, first of all, at conquering the population. To this end, all the means of revolutionary technique were utilized, from propaganda and terror to guerrilla actions destined for strengthening the movement.

As soon as the locally responsible individuals were instructed, a solid, territorial organization was established. Each village constituted a rebel cell, and each village had its politico-military committee under the committees of the superior echelons of the cantons and provinces. A people's police force was charged with seeing that prescribed measures were applied. Moreover, organizations which grouped the inhabitants in accordance with their professional activities, and in accordance with their age and sex, were employed for the indoctrination and the conquest of minds. Trapped, thus, in a complex system of both physical and moral effects, the population collaborated in the expansion of the rebel system.

Alongside the zones of obedience certain sectors of the national territory were occupied by the organization of the *Khmers-Issaraks* or "Free Cambodians." More or less allied with the national organization, they employed the same meth-

ods of clandestine administration destined for maintaining the population in strict obedience.

In the midst of a population organized in this way, the rebel forces were shielded from all surprises. With easy means for obtaining supplies, with a security organization and a permanent intelligence network at their disposal, they could allow themselves either to fall back before hostile forces, or to attack by surprise when possible and without too many risks.

The French and Cambodian civil and military authorities realized that nothing of any actual value could be accomplished as long as the rebels enjoyed the support of the population.

Various systems of pacification based on the construction of fortified works destined for the protection of the governmental authorities and the axes of communication were instituted. These did not obtain satisfactory results *due to the extreme dispersion of the inhabited places.* By day, the rebels seemed to be nonexistent, but night favored their activities of propaganda and terror. It was the permanent presence of the rebel administration and the fear of reprisals which tipped the scales in favor of the rebellion.

Thus during the years of 1951-52, in spite of all the administrative and military efforts, governmental authority over the population decreased and the influence of the rebels correspondingly increased.

### The Solution

The actual problem "boiled down," therefore, to taking away from the rebels the support of the population. To accomplish this the widely dispersed inhabitants had to be shielded from the reprisals of the rebels.

After many gropings and hesitations, the solution of following the precedent of the rebels was tried. The population was to be organized in such a way as to oblige it to side with the legal government, thereby ensuring its coordinated self-defense. To this end the habitations were to be regrouped in order to constitute large inhabited places in locations where they could be easily watched over by the government forces.

This solution had been tried with success in a frontier province in 1946. This province had been the victim of the Vietminh fury—at that period, *blind* fury—which burned the frontier villages. Rebuilt along the sides of the roads and highways, organized in accordance with a plan of defense and included in the frontier defense disposition, these villages were thereafter rarely disturbed. After that time this province was almost impermeable to the infiltrations and subversion which little by little extended over the rest of Cambodia.

Like methods were employed, with success, in the province of Kandal to protect the populations living along the banks of the Mekong and Bassac Rivers.

Regroupment of the populations seemed, therefore, to be the only method capable of dislodging the Vietminh *without leaving the possibility of a return* and, at the same time, shielding the inhabitants from its influence.

In spite of these examples, there was no official policy of reassemblage of the inhabitants. The initiative in the matter had been the responsibility of teams of men, civilian and military, and the action of the government was felt only in the form of relatively small material aid. It needed only the personal impulsion of the sovereign (who had become the chief of the government) for regroupment to be studied and carried out.

A Directorate of the *Autodefense of the Populations* was created in the Ministry of the Interior. Established on the basis of the particular situation in each province, the plan they evolved determined the zones where the regroupment would be accomplished.

The *method*, as finally settled on, was based on the following three principles:

*The regrouped inhabitants must be able, without too many difficulties, to work their cultivated terrains.*

The basic rule was to regroup the houses in such a way as to leave the inhabitants within normal operating distance of their sources of livelihood: rice fields or fishing areas. On the average the changes of locale of habitation extended from a few hundred meters to three kilometers, with the exception of certain forest hamlets which were regrouped at greater distances.

*The locations of the new villages must be in accord with the requirements of their collective life with respect to sources of water, health, and hygiene, and must be sufficiently large to accommodate the intended inhabitants.*

In each province special administrative teams were constituted to direct the operations. The locations were chosen, as far as possible, on state land, and when the land did not belong to the state, their owners exchanged those under cultivation for other pieces of land.

*The new villages must be included in the defense disposition of the canton and province.*

To this end the villages were regrouped close to a route or connected with it by a road either built or reconstructed to accommodate motor vehicles. Moreover, each village constituted a part of the network of defense. Surrounded by ditches and barricades, provided with protective blockhouses at its corners, the village constituted a strong point, all of whose men made up the local militia.

In addition, the security of each village was incumbent, militarily, on a counterguerrilla command. Located in the center of its zone of action, this trained and mobile unit continually made rounds outside of its base. Stopping in each village it brought the comfort of its presence to the inhabitants, and by means of the detachments which it constituted occupied itself with the instruction of the peasant militiamen who themselves defended their families and the terrains in which they labored.

It was recognized that the period of time between the harvesting of the rice and the rainy season was the most favorable for the regrouping of the populations. The other months of the year served for the preparation of the operations.

The regroupment zone, comprising several villages, was protected by the French Army from the beginning of the operation. Its units stationed themselves there permanently while the administrative teams, aided by propaganda specialists and specialists in medical assistance, gave themselves over to their particular work.

The peasants who were destined to assume posts of responsibility or to form armed groups were regrouped and underwent a period of civic and military instruction lasting two or three weeks, then returned home to their normal occupation. The soldiers took part in preparing the village and, at the same time, maintained security. They remained there until the stage of advancement reached by the defense works made it possible for local forces to resist the attacks of the rebels.

In the meantime, the permanent setup, composed of the village or canton authorities, provincial police, and the personnel of the counterguerrilla commands, was installed and took charge of the new defense zone.

### The Results

In 1952 this method was applied everywhere where the situation required it: in a thorough manner in the worst frontier provinces, and in a sporadic manner in the provinces of the interior. This crowding together of the population brought about a veritable revolution in the interior of Cambodia.

During a single season close to a half

million of the inhabitants of the frontier provinces of Kampot and Takeo were ranged solidly on the legal side. They were sheltered from the influence of the Vietminh which had utilized their area for several years as an important zone of transit for the equipment and armament purchased in Thailand. The rebel war treasury, which had been largely fed by high duties on the abundant products of these provinces, found itself seriously reduced.

In the face of the new situation the rebel committees and their people's police either departed for the zones which were still rebellious or, more simply, submitted and became, in the majority of instances, excellent defense elements. Transformed into sufficiently strong defensive organizations, the new villages held their own against the armed bands which formerly had kept the inhabitants in permanent terror.

The collective labor occasioned by the regroupment created a sense of solidarity, of confidence, and force which is given by mass and numbers. It gave birth to the indispensable conditions for engaging the population in the struggle.

The regular Vietminh forces, left to themselves, no longer benefited from popular support—the basic condition for their action—and rapidly disappeared from the defense zones of the populations. The government forces, now well informed, found it an easy task to surprise them and crush them before they were able to reach their place of refuge where the forest permitted them to escape. Several of their bands suffered heavy losses in this way.

From that time on, the army units, now freed from their mission of domestic protection, could be used for operations in the zones still held by the rebels. No longer giving them the initiative, they were able to push them farther and farther, destroy their bases, and progressively widen the pacified zones.

The active solidarity of the population has permitted the creation of actual communities, the indispensable basic cells of political and social life. The new heads of the villages, of the defense militias, and of the various organizations have acquired a new conception of their responsibilities. A new elite, conscious of responsibilities toward their compatriots, has been constituted.

The drawing together of the populations thus created the conditions for an amelioration in the economic and social domains as well as in the political domain. It represents an important factor of its progress for the new Cambodia. A domestic revolution is being realized.

### Objectives of Revolutionary War

This Cambodian example contains some very valuable lessons which merit special study.

It is certain that the factors which permitted the success of the defense actions of the Cambodian populace are peculiar to the country considered. This example, therefore, cannot constitute a cut-and-dried mode of combat against the classical methods of revolutionary warfare. From the study it appears, as a matter of fact, that the results were obtained through an adaptation of the system to each different region considered.

Nevertheless, such an experiment carried out on so large a scale demonstrates that a country of modest dimensions with but small material resources can solve its own particular problem of insecurity. It presents, in addition, general and specific information concerning a system which represents an efficacious counterguerrilla procedure—on this basis it merits further consideration.

The failure of police techniques in the fight against terrorism in the urban centers and the ineffectiveness of the methods of a regular army in the neutralization of the rebel bands in the rural areas are demonstrated in the results obtained. These

failures are occasioned, in the main, by the widespread influence of the rebel organization on the local population.

When the forces of law and order run up against the barrier of the active or passive complicity of the inhabitants, their initial strength progessively diminishes until the moment when the dominance changes camp. On one hand, the mass of the population participates more and more in the rebellion; on the other hand, the government elements continuously lose support.

The origin of such movements must not be attributed to traditional, economic, or social motives. The real causes are of a political nature: the objective being the seizure of power.

This is accomplished mainly through control of the population. Experience shows that when the inhabitants are drawn into the system of territorial organization of the rebels, the official side loses its authority.

The transformations observed in Cambodia as a result of the application of the methods used in the various political, economic, and social domains show that, far from restricting the development of a people, the system of the self-defense of population centers contributes powerfully to its evolution.

It is not one of its least merits that such a solution, while satisfying the need for security, at the same time gives the inhabitants new opportunities for development in accord with their legitimate desire for progress.

---

# Tactics and Atomics

**Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Colonel M. F. Brogan in the "Australian Army Journal" November 1955.**

ONE could be forgiven for believing that the advent of atomic weapons into the tactical field has in one bludgeoning stroke removed the finesse, the nicety of moves and countermoves, and the necessity for high proficiency in individual training and detailed staff work called for in the past. The awful power of these devices as compared to conventional weapons, together with the absence of any international convention governing their use (as is the case with gas warfare), portends World War III as a short succession of rapid holocausts in which all the tactical principles we have learned hitherto will be subjugated to the object of getting in first with the only blow required. One atomic device exploded somewhere near the center of gravity of the enemy's field forces would appear to resolve each operation.

Closer reflection, however, indicates that the foregoing conception is rather absolute and needs to be tempered with factual considerations. Some of these considerations are associated with the atomic devices themselves; for example, the time taken to deliver one at the right time and place. Others relate to the well-established principles of preservation learned in earlier warfare but to some extent overlooked since 1918—such as the protection afforded by solid earth and the vulnerability of mass attacks to firepower.

There is no doubt that while either side has an atomic weapon the "good old days" of warfare are gone forever, but, on the other hand, this does not mean that all of our current tactical doctrine must be scrapped. Indeed, without trying to oversimplify the issue, a theoretical investigation (and the price per atom bomb permits only this at present) will show that the

old principles, varied in application in degree only, will still prove sound. The degree will be in terms of such factors as ground, size of forces, mobility, protective works, time, and space. After all, the physical effects of an atomic explosion are heat, blast, and radiation, the two former of which are not new to war (albeit in a less efficient degree weight for weight) and the latter of which is now shown as not the inexorable killer it was first believed to be.

The rational approach to the use of atomic weapons would seem, therefore, to be somewhere on a line between resigning ourselves to hopelessness of combating them on one hand and regarding them as just a new series of explosive devices on the other. Admittedly, no sane person subscribes to either of these philosophies, but let us examine some tactical concepts to determine the weight due to each with a view to establishing a more realistic picture of the influence of atomic weapons on the battlefield. For the sake of simplicity it is proposed to cover each of the phases of war, that is, advance, attack, defense, and withdrawal, plus a final summary.

It is assumed that the vehicles available for the delivery of atomic devices are: aerial bombs, guided missiles, atomic artillery, land mines, and pre-positioned weapons, and that both sides have over-all parity in devices and the means of delivering them. This postulation is an unlikely one, but is chosen here for the sake of simplicity. Variation of these conditions or of other relevant factors would materially influence any conclusions drawn here.

### The Advance

In recapitulating some of the more important principles involved in a successful advance (including the advance to contact, the followup, and the pursuit), we are reminded of the importance of the necessity to reconnoiter on a wide front, tactical surprise, the early capture of tactical features (firm bases), the maintenance of momentum, good control, intelligence, tactical grouping and local protection, sound logistics, and morale.

As in other phases the object might well be to force the enemy into a position where he will become vulnerable to atomic attack while ensuring we do not present him with a similar target. This emphasizes perhaps more than hitherto the early requirement for information, particularly relating to enemy dispositions, lines of withdrawal, defiles, check points, and administrative installations where suitable targets are likely to eventuate. The laying on of an air strike or the deployment of ground-to-ground missile units is presently indicated to take considerably longer than that involved in using conventional projectiles. This, and the fleeting nature of targets such as mechanized columns, underlines the importance of a streamlined reporting system based on a combination of reconnaissance aircraft, radar, agents, and armored vehicles. This system also would be required to report on enemy atomic preparations, such as the fabrication of launching ramps, which might be engaged by our offensive air support or counterbattery artillery.

On our part, the need for dispersion consistent with control and the requirements of local protection arises more forcibly. A concentration of a certain number of men to the square mile will constitute a density sufficient to warrant the use of an atom bomb. Axes of advance should be chosen where terrain, groupings, and speed do not combine adversely to produce an atomic target. The concomitant requirement of a reliable intercommunication system covering the necessary dispersion is a vital factor to the control of this type of advance.

Our selection of tactical boundaries could conceivably be modified by the enemy's possession of atomic weapons in the field. In the past the high topographical features which could be held against a

turning enemy have been most essential from the advancer's point of view. It is now well known that atomic blast from the air burst of a nominal (20 kiloton) bomb will kill at 1,000 yards by either heat flash or an overdose (2,500 Roentgens) of gamma rays. This lethality may not be possible from tactical weapons at this range, but the possibility remains that those exposed on high features may become casualties from heat flash and/or radiation alone, as well as blast.

Boundaries may, therefore, be selected where the ground offers good reverse slope positions and where personnel may gain a certain amount of protection from the "atomic shadow" provided by the figuration of the ground and its relationship to ground zero.

Where it is necessary that close contact be maintained regardless of the possible exposure to atomic explosions, the need to protect fighting personnel from the effects of such explosions stresses the need for having the maximum number of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled guns well forward. In addition to the mobility necessary for this type of operation, such equipment affords an acceptable degree of protection to crews against all three products of fission. The crossing of radioactive ground or the concentration of forces for a quick tactical decision would appear to be directly related to the numbers of such vehicles which are available. This, balanced against the offering of a suitable atomic target when forming up, may well call for a nicety of tactical judgment on the commander's part.

The air aspect is a dominating factor. It is most likely that in an advance, at least a favorable local air situation will prevail. In addition to providing tactical reconnaissance, this situation could be exploited (subject always to the efficacy of the enemy's ground-to-air missiles) in such roles as bypassing of radioactive ground to seize tactical features with airborne troops; denying enemy air observation over our concentrations, installations, or movement; and resupplying field units where maintenance areas are liable to atomic attack.

### The Attack

The following basic considerations in planning the classical attacks warrant attention:

*Launching of the attack from a firm base and the gaining of firm bases for subsequent phases.*

*Penetrative power of the attack in depth on a narrow front (except across wide obstacles).*

*Security of lines of departure.*

*Early movement forward of supporting weapons.*

*Maintaining momentum.*

*The need to widen the gap of penetration to get behind and to outflank the enemy positions.*

Of the above requirements, probably the most telling is that of momentum. If the attack is slowed down or stopped, and the enemy given the chance to regroup and hit back, the chances of our attack succeeding become slimmer. It is after the break is forced in enemy lines that this critical stage will probably occur, that is, when the enemy has recovered from his initial shock and has had time to get his defense plan (including his counterattack) into operation. At such a stage all our resources of close support, tanks, artillery, and offensive air are called into play. It is now that the extra punch is required.

Atomic weapons used indiscriminately in such a melee may clear the battlefield, but probably of both sides and with resultant indecision. Suitable targets would appear to be on the outskirts of the area and include headquarters, command posts, signal centers, artillery positions, tank assembly areas, and reinforcement routes. Thus interdiction on a tactical scale may

be achieved, leaving the mopping up to be done by the attackers using conventional weapons.

The preparatory stage of the attack will require somewhat more caution than hitherto. The massing of men and material in preliminary positions, such as concentration areas, and assembly areas, has always been fraught with a certain amount of risk, but now the vulnerability of such concentrations is even less acceptable. This may involve more such areas, smaller forces or more limited objectives, or some combination of these factors.

If our requirement of attacking with a maximum of momentum on a narrow front is not to be upset, we must face up to smaller, harder-hitting, mobile, protected forces extended in considerable depth in "get set" positions behind a secure line of departure. These, in turn, must be supported by adequate atomic firepower and backed up, if necessary, by tactically grouped reserves ready to bypass dog fights and maintain the initial impact of the breakthrough.

A cover plan to mask preparatory activity is indicated in the above atomic setting. Deception or simulations, to include dummy signal traffic, sonic devices, mock-up guns, vehicles, and tanks, should repay effort. Resupply of expensive and complex atomic devices to either side is not likely to approach the same scale as for conventional ammunition, and every abortive enemy round fired is a contribution to the unbalancing of his logistics.

Routes to lines of departure will require careful consideration to ensure that "man density" is not increased by reason of piling up at obstacles, defiles, and minefields. The arrival of a well-placed atomic missile among the attacking force during this opening gambit could involve the abandonment or postponement of the operation. This consideration will need to be balanced with the narrow front complex and may force the use of more axes on a wider front, followed by convergence after contact.

Once battle is joined, close contact as well as momentum will need to be maintained right through the pursuit stage. Thus the enemy becomes, in effect, an atomic shield whose proximity to our forces will lessen the likelihood of enemy atomic missiles being launched against the interlocked combatants.

*It should not, however, be discounted that the enemy's philosophy and reinforcement position may be such that the simultaneous liquidation of both friend and foe will be justifiable in certain circumstances.*

Because of the need to husband our resources of atomic missiles, the decision to use them will remain at a high level. For the immediate future and until all commanders are experienced in the use of these devices, a specially trained staff officer would appear justified to advise on the probable effects of atomic requests before they are approved. Such an advisor should be kept continuously informed of the tactical situation by means of a reporting and control organization possibly superimposed on the air support signal system.

As before, success will be materially affected by the local air situation, and the availability of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled guns. These factors, if favorable, will enhance our ability to deploy and to take quick advantage of the targets presented by enemy concentrations.

### The Defense

In this phase of warfare we have been taught conventionally to give emphasis to depth, concealment, all-around defense, mutual support, a coordinated plan including counterattack, the need to sustain morale, domination of ground between opposing forces, centralized control of artillery, protection of obstacles, and good communications.

Probably the greatest influence of atomic

attack will be to increase the depth of defense, and this means depth in two planes, deep in distance and deep down. The emphasis is on digging. Here the human element enters and, regardless of the latest scientific developments, the fighting soldier using hand tools can be expected to dig in at no more than the old standard rate of one cubic yard an hour. Therefore, to be effective against atomic attack, hasty defenses will require the application of mechanized equipment on a large scale.

To meet this situation, a case certainly exists for the formation of special earth-moving units with the primary role of construction of field works. (An empirical figure determined for Australian troops in World War II was that one brake horsepower was on an average the equivalent in output of two and one-half men. Assuming that a machine can work twice as many shifts as a soldier, one 35 horsepower excavator is the approximate equivalent of 175 men.) The indication is clear —more horsepower in the defense.

The requirements of all-around defense, mutual support, protection of obstacles, control, and good communications militate against the dispersion necessary to avoid mass casualties from the one blast. This points to small self-contained bastions of defense supported by more self-propelled artillery. The risk of penetration and defeat in detail must be countered by thicker minefields, and mobile, hard-hitting counterattack forces kept on the move or ready to concentrate for a quick decision. The need to disperse will reduce the effectiveness of control to a degree which will demand a high order of initiative in, and a granting of freedom of action to, junior commanders and leaders.

While avoiding concentration ourselves, it will obviously be to our advantage if we can force the enemy into a worthwhile mass formation in an area where he is exposed to our atomic weapons. In a defensive sector this may well be achieved by the large-scale use of tactical and defensive wire, minefields, and possibly radioactive material to render certain ground untenable. This presupposes a very deliberate defense, but may be possible in a modified form in a hasty operation.

A prerequisite to a successful defense against enemy atomic attack will be a high state of training and morale. Apart from the physical havoc to be seen immediately on detonation, it is going to demand a high state of morale and efficiency to keep a participant fighting with the knowledge that he has absorbed a lethal amount of gamma radiation and his remaining life can be measured in hours.

The selection of the ground to be defended in relation to vital ground will, in the future, be influenced to some degree by its relative exposure to atomic blast. Here, again, reverse slope positions seem to offer a certain attraction, but a lot will depend on technical developments, particularly in the fuzing of weapons and the accuracy of their control.

Concealment, camouflage, and deception will demand considerable attention. The combination of hiding targets and diverting enemy atomic ammunition to nonexistent concentrations is a tactical advantage and, in the long-term view, a dissipation of valuable enemy resources.

It is probable that the enemy will be aware of the atomic potential against him, and will be wary of massing large numbers for attack. Should he do so, however, it is imperative that this be discovered before he effects close contact. This will entail the pre-positioning and registration on our part of launching devices and/or atomic artillery, together with an efficient warning system.

Unless the defense has been organized on a deliberate basis and defenders are well protected, it seems unlikely that any close support in the nature of counter-preparation or final protective fire will be practicable from atomic sources. It is

more likely that such support will be reserved for harassing fire or softening up prior to a deliberate counterattack.

In the field of resupply our present system of road- or rail bound convoys feeding static maintenance areas is relatively inflexible and liable to neutralization by a few atomic missiles. An overhauling seems necessary to reduce the amounts and types of supplies brought up. The means of bringing them up will likely be by aircraft requiring no elaborate forward airfield, that is, helicopters supplemented by fixed-wing aircraft in appropriate situations.

### The Withdrawal

In this temporary phase of warfare, planning is usually directed to the withdrawal of tactical groups from, through, and to firm bases; simplicity commensurate with flexibility; strict timings and centralized control; secrecy; and the achievement of a clean break, together with the avoidance of a running fight.

Usually the adverse factor is time. The operation is started more often than not without much warning and is executed in a hasty manner. These circumstances react against the completion of reconnaissance, detailed staff work, and, most importantly, the completion of intermediate or main positions from which we can stand and fight back. The time taken to complete effective protective works against atomic blast, even with increased engineer support, is going to be protracted. The decision to hold intermediate positions must be carefully considered in the light of the amount of excavation possible in the time available, and whether it would be more prudent to divert this effort into preparation of the main position. Similarly, covering positions, being even less effective in stopping power, cannot be relied on against atomic assault.

A likely pattern of withdrawal, then, might be to move rearward in longer bounds, or one bound only, to a main position prepared with the extensive use of earth-moving equipment and mechanical minelayers. To enable the retreating force to gain its quick break and unmolested occupation of the new position, something drastic in the way of staving off the enemy may have to be done. This might take the form of an atomic barrage while the getaway is achieved, or if this is considered too prodigal, to attack in force with a grouping which is capable of changing to a rear guard role when the main body is clear of the action.

Really spectacular results should be possible with atomic devices in the demolition aspects of the withdrawal, but the tendency of enthusiastic vandals to crack nuts with sledge hammers will have to be watched.

The time and manpower involved in preparing demolition belts has given rise to two types of demolition—"preliminary," which are blown when ready, and "tactical," which are blown when tactically necessary. It is obvious that any large-scale preliminary demolition activity prejudices secrecy and militates against the clean break. The absolute destructive effect of atomic charges should reduce the work involved in preparing structures for demolition and eliminate the necessity for preliminary neutralization, thereby completely reducing the chances of disclosing our retrogressive intentions.

Once the rearward movement is apparent to the enemy and his followup commences, there will probably be scope for our inflicting delay by the detonation of carefully sited atomic land mines. Apart from the casualties inflicted by heat and blast, there will remain the persistent hazard of gamma radiation. Such deterrents located between primary demolition belts and supplemented by nuisance minefields should slow the pursuer down to the degree necessary for our disengagement and redeployment in the new position.

In common with the other phases discussed above, the requirement will exist

here to avoid concentrations of men and equipment, to provide a large degree of mobility and armored protection for personnel, to operate under a favorable air situation, and to ensure the provision of adequate earth-moving equipment.

### Conclusions

The introduction of atomic weapons into the tactical fields has brought new problems into the conduct of operations. These problems can be solved using accepted tactical doctrine, modified to the degree imposed by the physical effects of atomic detonation in specific field conditions.

The major unit reorganization necessary is in artillery units to undertake the offensive use of atomic missiles. In addition, a real need exists to ensure that engineer support is of such a scale and so equipped that the provision of protective works against atomic assault is feasible in most field situations. Intercommunication and control systems now operative should be extended or duplicated to provide facilities for rapidly reporting, requesting, or approving atomic action.

During atomic activity, the need is emphasized to provide adequate resources of tanks, self-propelled guns, and armored personnel carriers to exploit or withdraw from atomic explosions.

Control of atomic missile expenditure should be vested in the most senior commander practicable and he should be assisted by a specialist trained in the technicalities of such missiles.

Some of the prime requirements in training for and conduct of field operations involving the use of atomic weapons are:

*Mechanized, protected, and self-contained movement.*

*Freedom of tactical action for junior commanders and leaders—the encouragement of initiative and the stimulation of leadership qualities.*

*Concentrations of men, material, and maintenance areas must be avoided, and the aim must be to force the enemy into such concentrations.*

*Roadbound lines of communication are to be avoided, and flexibility in resupply achieved by the use of aircraft, with a reduction in the quantities of supplies brought forward, particularly creature comforts.*

*Maximum mobility and range of artillery weapons must be gained.*

*Maximum resources of manpower-saving devices must be provided to include a high proportion of earth-moving and minelaying equipments.*

*Moves must be in long jumps between well-dug, firm bases.*

*Local air superiority is essential to successful ground operations.*

*Disperse, dig, disappear, and deceive.*

---

## REPRINTS

Specific permission to reprint material from the MILITARY REVIEW is needed only in the case of articles or items identified as being copyrighted. If other material from the MILITARY REVIEW is reprinted, it is requested that the author and the magazine be given credit by the display of the following credit line:

> "*(Title of the article reprinted or from which material is taken)* by *(author)* was first published in the *(month and year)* issue of the MILITARY REVIEW, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas."

# There Must Be Discipline

**Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major Heinz Karst in "Das Parlament" (Germany) 5 September 1956.**

IN THE daily report of a German lieutenant on the Eastern Front in 1943, there is a significant passage concerning a capable noncommissioned officer who for weeks had been holding a bitterly contested position on the front:

*The men are not good for much, frankly speaking, but this one man is worth a hundred men. What control he has over his men! How one can sense in every word the superior sureness of the veteran soldier! This man has not become soft, as so many others. He is not sociable in that way that betokens only weakness and, therefore, his men respect him. In his small bunker his weapons are in neat order: rifle beside rifle; hand grenades in a row ready for use; dispatch cases, a few books, and writing materials on a shelf on the wall; cooking utensils set out in correct military order on another. He who wishes may laugh at this, but I know today that these things represented nothing superficial, but were expressive of the best of traits in the soldierly character. Ask the common soldier; ask him whether he would prefer such a commander, or one of another type. The reply will come without hesitation: 'That noncom's all right!' The common soldier knows very well that at critical moments his life depends on the courage and energy of his commander.*

Such statements, direct from the frontlines, are more expressive than many a carefully phrased statement from the pen of the professional writer. No military unit on earth can exist without strict discipline, whether in peace or in war. The ideas of discipline and the ability to "take it" have always been associated with the existence of the soldier by the man on the street—whether agreeing with it or not.

Undisciplined, disobedient soldiers, whose training has left them soft, never have the confidence of their fellow citizens and can not be worth the sacrifices that are made by their community for the defense of their country. Only militarily competent forces, excellently trained and equipped, will command that respect from friend and enemy that makes possible the protection of the peace of a free people. These are fundamental facts which no advance in the technique of armaments can nullify.

We all know from experience, however, to what a calamitous degree discipline and obedience can degenerate; how shamefully men may be treated on the pretext of discipline; and how petty noncommissioned officers may vent their choler in the name of discipline. It is often intentionally overlooked, but this degeneration has been discernible in all domains of our national life, not in army life alone.

Justified distrust toward servile obedience and heartless discipline must not be permitted to lead to the conclusion that there is no call for discipline in human existence and that in the armed services it is necessary only to a limited degree. We need it badly in our entire public life, from the traffic in our streets to politics, from the spoken word to the report in the daily press and over the radio.

We find a comparatively close agreement with this idea in a work of Theodor Eschenburg, who certainly cannot be accused of any tendency toward militarism:

*To permanently ensure the democratic order of the state, that is, to render it proof against crisis, requires an enormous effort, namely, discipline in general and severity with respect to one's own self and toward others.*

In the face of the altered military situation that is presented through the influence of technique and politics on international relationships, we need it all the more in the German armed forces. The demands on the soldiers are increased in every respect—physically, spiritually, technically, politically, and legally. How else can we account for the fact that the soldiers in the democratic countries like England, France, Switzerland, and America are subjected to a much "stiffer" training than was ever the case with us. Have we lost the correct idea of the value of discipline?

### Training

Every virtue stands midway between two undesirable extremes. Thus bravery stands between foolhardiness and cowardice, obedience between opposition and servility, and discipline between anarchy and mechanical subservience. These indispensable virtues of human coexistence are continually threatened from the direction of their extremes—and this is true in all domains, not in the military alone. But this does not nullify their worth any more than the misuse of freedom nullifies the worth of freedom. We must recognize that the free order of existence, for whose protection we are arming, makes more severe demands on every single citizen than the totalitarian state, for the reason that it relies on our self-discipline and sense of responsibility rather than compulsion and punishment. If not, our public life can never go well no matter how prosperous our material existence may be. So long as we believe that the citizens in arms mean an easing-up of the rigid professional compulsion of the soldier and that obedience and discipline among citizens are matters for individual choice, just so long would a "democratic" army constitute only a testimony of our inability to live together in freedom.

Self-discipline is, more than ever, the indispensable foundation of military discipline. The soldier's collaboration in thought and deed, his initiative, his readiness to assume the responsibility of decisions, his voluntary compliance with the demands of the military system, his well-trained bearing, his upright manliness in the protection of his own dignity and that of mankind, his courage in the cause of freedom, his soldierly discipline, his spirit of camaraderie and readiness to help others—these are the things which give the army its "democratic" face. The "democratic" face is not obtained through an emphasized laxity of manners, comfortableness of training, easiness of service, curtailment of formalities, negligence in salutation, and civilian dress when the duty period is over.

Strict maintenance of discipline "is of benefit to all" in the service. Before one became a soldier, he may have entertained doubts about this matter. However, after he has traveled in a patrol boat in a storm, sat in a tank under a burning sun, or traveled in a jet fighter at supersonic speed, and has experienced the sober earnestness of the soldier's service, he no longer has any doubts concerning the matter.

### Inner Consent

Voluntary compliance, self-discipline, and obedience based on consciousness of responsibility cannot be forced on a man nor ensured by punishment. This would be a contradiction in itself. They must be produced by training and practice and fortified by conviction. This high degree of consent to the task and of readiness to assume responsibility in the service is not always apparent in all soldiers or present from the very beginning in all recruits. Continual rewards and commendations, training, and punishment, if necessary, are the lot of those who resist. The same thing is to be found in the family, in youth organizations, and in industry.

Soldierly discipline in the German

armed forces must be based on the inner consent of the soldiers to the tasks and forms of the service. It must leave room for their initiative and good will and finds its expression in an alert and sportsmanlike attitude.

Punctuality, accuracy, correct dress, cleanliness, logicalness in judgment and action, strictness, severity, training which approximates that required in war, a chivalrous and understanding attitude toward the weak and defenseless—these are the manifestations and means of indispensable soldierly discipline.

There are many individuals among us who are inclined either to overvalue or to reject outward form completely. As a matter of fact, the Silesian writer Friedrich von Logau is entirely correct when he states: "As things change outwardly, so they change inwardly!" It would be foreign to the truth to base discipline solely on the readiness of the soldier entering the service to comply with its demands, and it would be still more erroneous to base it on external compulsion. But firm methods of training, properly employed, are both a means and an outward expression of discipline.

### Organized Sports

In no activities are means and outward expression more easily harmonized than in properly organized sports. Where the human individual is engaged in sports, that harmonization of form and attitude which we call discipline is the most easily realized. On this account, more space and time must be devoted to sports in the training of the German soldiers than was formerly the case and, above all, voluntary sports during the afterduty period should be stressed.

But the military service is no game. A continually sports-like concept by the soldier would not be consistent with the seriousness and responsibility of his mission. The true soldier, therefore, will subordinate the sports-like side of the service to that side that is deadly serious. To bear the load of this seriousness—to hold his own in the horror of the battlefield even when there is no commander and few comrades present—he needs a high order of self-discipline born of habitual impulses. Above all, there is needed the strength and courage imparted by comradeship and community of combat purpose.

Because of this the little combat crew in the submarine, in the tank, in the scout car, in the airplane, in the armored personnel carrier, and at the cannon will rank highest in its display of training. Technique demands this, as does also the human environment of the combatant. Political training, an understanding of our democratic and social order, and the experience derived from historical examples will help all soldiers to attain a deeper conviction of the rightfulness of their assigned task, and to achieve self-discipline.

Yet all of this: sports, group instruction, political indoctrination, and realistic combat training are not sufficient alone, if the human intercourse of the soldiers with one another is not in accord with simple, yet strict, disciplinary measures. From orderliness in rooms and shops to the salute and its return; from the phrasing of the report to the wording of the command; from the barracks duty to the unit ceremonial—the tendency toward a simple form, without undue wordiness or empty convention, must represent the prevailing style.

President Adenauer once said: "Our young Democracy must discover its style." There is no doubt but that the young German Army must also discover a style, a style which will correspond with the thinking of the citizens and which will be expressive of the disciplined selflessness of the military service.

# What Type of Army?

**Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from a copyrighted article by Lieutenant Colonel L. H. Landon in "The Journal of the Royal Artillery" (Great Britain) July 1955.**

FOR the last half century the British Army has had to cope with two problems: the problem of providing an army trained, equipped, and at all times ready for a colonial war; and the problem of providing an army trained, equipped, and ready at short notice to take its place on the Continent alongside allies in a major world war, and capable of very rapid and almost indefinite expansion. Perhaps as a result of this, the British Army has always been accused of preparing for the last war.

A hundred years ago these two types of war were so similar that the organization and training of one type of army could solve both problems. But the two problems have required different treatment progressively, until we have reached the point where they require *radically* different solutions. The one requires a "conventional" army; the other an "atomic" army. The organization, training, equipment, and supply of these two armies will have to be fundamentally different.

### Peripheral Wars

Experience has proved that our present type national service army, assisted by the Gurkha Brigade and by troops recruited in colonial territories, is capable of giving a very good account of itself in peripheral wars fought with conventional weapons such as the conflicts in Korea, Malaya, and Kenya. There is little need to change our type of organization and training for these minor wars.

But it is doubtful whether this "conventional" army, based on national service, could stand up to the strains and stresses to which units and individual soldiers would be subjected in an "atomic" war. It is even more doubtful whether our present system of mobilization, our organization, and our supply system could stand up to an "atomic" war.

### Atomic Wars

The first few hours, days, and months of the next war will probably commence with a surprise air attack from the east without any alert or even tension. Our first warning of the outbreak of war will be from the information provided by the global early-warning radar screen of the approach of Soviet bombers.

This will set off the great air battle—offensive and counteroffensive—during which the two strategic air forces will throw thermonuclear, atomic, and conventional bricks at each other and at each other's territories, both sides struggling to gain air supremacy and to eliminate the other at one blow. Unfortunately, in this duel the Russians will have the initiative: "He is twice armed that gets his blow in first."

What the Russian targets will be one cannot tell, but it is reasonable to think that Great Britain will suffer considerable damage, including damage to her ports, and in western continental Europe airfields, ports, and communications will suffer considerable devastation.

### Task of "Atomic" Army

The job of the "atomic" army is, quite simply, to hold western Europe. Shoulder to shoulder with its allies it must prevent the Russian hordes from overruning free Europe. As Field Marshal Montgomery has pointed out, it will be useless to think of withdrawal from Europe with the object of liberating it at some later date as we did in the last war. After an atomic air offensive and a Russian occupation there will be nothing to liberate. The home of western civilization will have been

destroyed far more thoroughly than Roman civilization was destroyed by the barbarians.

Thus our "atomic" army must *hold.*

### Conditions of Atomic War

As a result of enemy action our field army may well find itself virtually isolated from the base ports, although some supplies and reinforcements may trickle forward, landed over beaches and finding their way forward by any means still intact. But there will be no possibility of a formal mobilization and reinforcement of the field army with men, equipment, ammunition, and supplies after the outbreak of war as was the case in 1914 and 1939. Each formation and each unit will have to fight with the men it possesses and with the arms which it has in hand. It will have to continue to fight thus until it can be supplied and reinforced by air—until eventually the atomic desert in its rear can be cleared up and a normal supply system set up. This may take a very considerable time.

In addition to the usual unpleasantness—high-explosive shells, conventional bombs, bullets, flamethrowers, and tanks —to which he became accustomed in the last contest, the individual soldier may have to face direct attack by atomic weapons. If it is to escape heavy casualties from tactical atomic weapons, the army must operate in a state of *great dispersion* both in defense and in attack. This means that units, subunits, and the individual soldier must learn to fight alone, isolated on the battlefield and separated from his comrades. As Sir John Tedder indicated, the "atomic" army may have to go on fighting under enemy air attack without any immediate air support.

All this will put an immense, almost intolerable, strain on the willpower and courage of each individual soldier and on each unit and subunit commander. Only an army with the highest standards of discipline, morale, and individual training can possibly face such a strain and dominate such a situation. But it was for just these eternal soldierly qualities, in their highest degree, that the British regular armies, from Marlborough to Mons, were famous.

The problem, therefore, is one of overcoming the effects of the isolation of the field army as a whole from its bases, and the isolation of the individual soldier on the battlefield.

### Isolation of the Army

Air-transportable formations to act as a strategic reserve are a definite requirement. This reserve should be trained, equipped, and organized for "atomic" war —that is to say that they should be an integral part of our "atomic" army—and must be kept at the same state of readiness as the field army in western Europe.

The reserve must be stationed within easy air reach of the battlefield of western Europe. It should not be situated in industrial or highly populated areas or near centers of air force activity, but should be kept in relatively unpopulated localities, such as the highlands of Scotland, parts of the Iberian Peninsula, or in parts of North Africa.

Its airlift may well form part of the Royal Air Force, but this airlift should be constantly trained with the "atomic" reserve formations and should be at the same state of immediate readiness. Whether this airlift should consist of conventional transport aircraft or of helicopters, or of a mixture of both, is a technical matter, but both the reserve formations and their airlift must work in the closest confidence and harmony.

Another requirement to overcome the isolation of the army from its bases is an "air bridge" logistical organization, operating from dispersed bases situated in underpopulated localities. The bases will consist of depots of personnel and of all types of material. The airlift for this logistic air bridge might well be organized

in the same way as that for the reserve formations: the same RAF command might carry out both jobs. This logistical organization must be kept in the same state of readiness as the field army it is to serve.

### Isolation of the Individual

The second and more difficult problem is how to overcome the stresses and strains which dispersion on the "atomic" battlefield will place on units, subunits, and, above all, on the individual soldier, and how to maintain effective coordinated action between these isolated entities.

The power of an army is still based on the will to fight of the individual soldier, and he is still the most important single factor in war. The will to fight of the soldier is based on morale and discipline. These, in turn, are the product of mutual understanding, trust, and respect between officers, noncommissioned officers, and men, and are built up over a long period of cooperation in work and play—on duty and off duty. The will to fight of an army, and of each unit and man in it, is based on the confidence of each man in its commander—on each man's personal knowledge of the commander, his personality, his experience, and his past successes.

Wellington's soldiers defeated the much larger French armies in the peninsula and at Waterloo by virtue of their greater discipline. They had confidence in Wellington. They knew him personally and they had confidence in his skill and his experience—and his record of victories.

But the British Squares which threw back the French cavalry at Waterloo had a far easier task than the isolated British soldier will have on the atomic battlefield. At Waterloo each man fought in physical contact with his comrades—on each side of him and behind him—with his officers close by to give him the encouragement of their presence and example. The Square had a corporate morale. But the will to fight of the soldier isolated on the atomic battlefield will have to be based on morale and discipline of an even higher quality and texture.

Again, each soldier will not only have to be an expert in the use of his weapons but also in personal survival. He will have to be taught that it is more glorious to survive and go on fighting, than to die, however bravely. But to survive and to fight on the atomic battlefield the soldier will require a very high degree of individual skill and training.

Thus to overcome these individual and collective handicaps of great dispersion on the atomic battlefield, the army will require an infinitely high degree of morale and discipline, of individual and collective skill. If the army does not possess these high standards, it will collapse.

Can this standard be achieved by the present British National Service System? The answer is an emphatic unconditional "NO."

This is to cast no slur on the National Service soldier—some of the finest military raw material in the world. But the high degree of discipline and skill required cannot be obtained under a system of constant changes, postings, shuffling, and instability which is unavoidable in a two-year National Service System.

### Requirements of "Atomic" Army

We must have a long service professional regular army for our "atomic" army. The men of this army will not be military morons—or the sweepings of the jails—but must undoubtedly be highly skilled military craftsmen, experts in arms and in survival on the "atomic" battlefield, welded together by discipline and long training into a skilled military team.

Their morale cannot be based on NAAFI (comparable to United States post exchanges) and concert parties, on films and television, for in history the best soldiers were those who have lived, and played, hard.

Their discipline will be based, as I have

said, on mutual respect and trust, the fruit of long association between all ranks in work and play and directed by experienced and tried commanders. ("There are no bad soldiers, only bad officers; no bad units, only bad commanders.") Their recreation will be games and sports—football, riding, skiing, and sailing. Their officers must be with them for long periods, broken only by the necessary courses at military schools. There must be an end of constant changing of stations. Each unit will be a family.

Their individual training will have to be long, careful, and very thorough. Unit and formation training will have to be continuous and realistic—training the individual and unit to act collectively in dispersion. The unit and the individual will have to learn to live and fight light; no masses or congested columns of transport—just a few cross-country vehicles backed by helicopters.

Their higher commanders in the field will be chosen from the best tried and tested regimental officers and staff officers of field formations, whose edge has not been blunted by long periods of polishing their ever-expanding bellies against the desks of the War Office and static headquarters.

The headquarters of the "atomic" army must remain field mobile. They must not be allowed to dig themselves in to comfortable billets, to provide ideal atomic targets for the enemy. Any senior commander who loves his comfort more than his mobility should be ruthlessly eliminated.

The readiness of the army for immediate action will have to be maintained by constant unexpected alerts and exercises. The strength of all units will have to be kept sufficiently above their war establishment to make good the wastage due to leave, courses, and sickness, so that at any moment every unit can take the field at full strength.

Such an army can only be a professional army. It must attract the best young men by good pay and conditions of service. It will get the men it needs if it keeps up its standards, for men enjoy serving in a good outfit, and they dislike serving in a sloppy and ineffective one.

### Territorial Army

Total war will probably break out without warning. After it has started there will be no possibility of mobilization or of moving formations and equipment across the Channel. There will be no time for the territorial army to mobilize and complete its training. Will there then be no place or work for the territorial army? Indeed, there will. Their task will be twofold, and both tasks will be of the highest importance.

First, during the initial shock the territorial army will be required to uphold the will to fight of the nation at home, by acting as the spearhead of the home defense army. It must be ready to act in several different ways, to repel airborne or seaborne landings, as mobile civil defense columns, or to buttress civilian services in badly hit areas by reestablishing communications and essential services and backing up the police.

After the first shock is over, after the situation on the home front is under control, when the western air force has wrested air supremacy from the enemy and after a period of field training, the units of the territorial army must be ready to move overseas to be integrated into formations of the regular army—or as territorial formations to take over territory conquered by the regular field army or to reinforce the "conventional" army in "peripheral" territories.

And what about the War Office—the heart of the army? The War Office is the most efficient and humane bureaucratic machine in the country. It is far better as a humble individual to fall into the hands of the War Office than into those of any other ministry. But it is a bureaucracy.

Service in the War Office does not increase an officer's efficiency as a leader of troops on the "atomic" battlefield, or as a staff officer of a field army headquarters. Different qualities are required and we cannot afford to waste our best field commanders and regimental field staff officers by having them sitting in the War Office.

Only the highest level officers of the War Office should come from the field army, and not all of these. The working staff should be made up of specially recruited military "civil servants," retired officers, and officers found to be unfit either physically or mentally for the arduous service in the "atomic" field army. The same applies, in a greater degree, to all static headquarters in Great Britain.

### Conclusion

If the above considerations are true, then we should take the following steps:

1. The formation of a small highly disciplined, highly trained, fully equipped, war strength professional regular army, stationed partly in Germany and partly as air-transportable formations within easy air reach of western Europe. This army must be ready for instant action, and must have its reserves of equipment, ammunition, and men within immediate reach. It must be ready to fight at any time with what it has with it, without relying on mobilization, reinforcement, or immediate supply. The air-transportable formations will constitute the strategic reserves in the hands of the supreme commander in western Europe.

2. The formation of an air transport logistic corps—using helicopters and conventional aircraft—to supply this regular army. This corps must be able to work from dispersed bases at considerable distance from the troops.

3. The formation of a civil defense army in the United Kingdom under military discipline with military training as well as civil defense training. This army will be based principally on the territorial army.

4. The formation of a colonial service army for peripheral wars—trained and equipped on conventional lines with conventional weapons. This could be partially a national service army with regular officers—partially an army recruited in colonial territories—and, of course, the Gurkha Brigade.

Is this practicable—can we afford it?

The answer depends on finance and the morale of the nation.

If the welfare state cannot afford to pay the kind of army which is necessary for the defense of its freedom, and if the welfare state cannot find the men to serve in a hard-living professional regular army, then Great Britain will go under in the next war and will deserve to.

But if the government is strong enough and courageous enough to tell the country the truth and to give the country a lead, then the country will respond. Our whole history is there to prove it.

Next time there will be no period of grace to give us time to prepare—there will be no phony war. We must be ready or we shall go under if war breaks out.

If we really are ready, there will not be a war. The price is well worth paying.

---


## MILITARY REVIEW BINDERS

**Why not file your copies of the MILITARY REVIEW in a sturdy binder available through the Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas? Each binder will hold 12 issues plus the Index and costs only $2.00, plus postage.**

# The Burden of Our Time

**Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Willy Bretscher in the "Swiss Review of World Affairs" (Switzerland) December 1956.**

THE last two years have been marked by the signs of an external "relaxation" in the USSR. With Moscow's brutal military intervention in satellite affairs all the basic theses of recent Soviet Russian foreign policy have broken down; "relaxation," "peaceful coexistence," "noninterference"—all these propaganda slogans have gone with the whirlwind of the events, and with them have gone the Western illusions about a change of the Bolshevist regime.

In view of these events there is no longer any use in racking one's brain on what the "de-Stalinization" in Soviet Russia may mean, or engaging in considerations of how the Politburo has gained the upper hand with the "victory" of the Soviet tanks over satellite fighters for freedom.

What is certain, and what we have to keep firmly in mind today, is the fact that when an oppressed people tried to loosen its chains, the Bolshevist regime beat it down ruthlessly through the intervention of the Soviet Army. For according to the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, revolutions can occur only in "Capitalist" states—on this point Stalin's successors may be assumed to agree. Whenever students, workers, and peasants rise up against the suppression of individual and national freedom anywhere in the "Socialist world system," they are sure to be considered "counterrevolutionaries" and "Fascists," who in the holy name of socialism must be destroyed by Soviet armed force.

This simple Bolshevist formula, which can transform even Party card-carrying workers into "Fascists" at a moment's notice, has been carried to its ultimate in the smothering of insurrections. Quite on the pattern of Stalin, who (according to Khrushchev) expanded the term "enemy of the people" to such an extent that he was able to apply it to any opponent to destroy him, his successors proceeded against a genuine people's uprising in a satellite state. One can actually speak of a "re-Stalinization," for by this pattern the entire arsenal of the dead dictator's devices—craft and treason, force and terror—has been mobilized to put down the "enemies of the Socialist revolution."

The self-revelation which Stalin's successors were forced to carry out with the military intervention in Hungary has still another significant aspect.

## Power

For the first time it has become perfectly clear to the world that in the obtuse mixture of Communist doctrine of salvation, the urge for power and world domination takes precedence over all spiritual and ideological factors, and constitutes the real substance of Soviet communism. The Soviet collective dictatorship in the Kremlin has shown that its major interest is naked power. The Communist social religion serves them only as a façade and vehicle for their claim—nihilistic in the final analysis—to absolute rule.

We are confronted here with an imperialism that appears completely dehumanized, and with a particularly hideous brand of "colonialism," if this word can be applied to a system of exploitation wholly unmitigated by as much as a spark of a sense of responsibility toward the peoples subjected to a status of unprecedented serfdom. It is the sudden instinctive realization of this terrible truth which shakes people in the West most deeply today.

It has become evident now how quickly the dynamism unleashed by the "de-Stalinization" and the related recognition of

Tito has jumped the tracks that Khrushchev had meant to lay down for it. The upheaval in the Communist Party of Poland and the national insurrection in Hungary are only the most visible and impressive signs of a general unrest prevailing in the satellite area which Moscow seeks to master by making a deterrent example of the Hungarians. Thus elementary forces and instincts cannot always be "controlled," and history may not be expected to run automatically true to the textbooks of the disciples of dialectical materialism.

### New Policies

The question of what new policy the rulers in Moscow will institute in this critical stage in view of the failure of the "coexistence" and "people's front" formula and in view of the simultaneous discrediting of the whole "Socialist peace camp," cannot be answered as yet. It appears that the Soviet rulers may themselves be uncertain, and possibly in disagreement with each other, on the course to be taken. The same impression can be derived from the frantic alternation of political and propaganda moves, threats, and assertions of peaceful intentions with which the free world is being showered from Moscow.

While some of these moves, such as the Russian disarmament offers, can be regarded as a desperate attempt to revive the idea of "peaceful coexistence" *in extremis*, other signs point to the disquieting fact that the masses in Russia are being conditioned anew to reckon with the existence of "Western warmongers" trying to destroy socialism and its Soviet citadel.

Foremost, however, is the other important question—whether the West will at last develop a concerted policy toward Soviet imperialism commensurate with the danger. The fateful weakness of the West so far has consisted, above all, in the lack of a realization of the nature and meaning of the global conflict between the system of government by tyranny and the forces of freedom. The countless deplorable fluctuations of mood and attitude and differences of opinion and evaluations have made it impossible for the free world to meet Moscow's psychological-political warfare in any adequate manner.

### Dominant Issue

The West must realize that the Communist threat constitutes the dominant issue of our time, that it is at the root of a conflict on a planetary scale, overshadowing all the other problems and conflicts which can only be judged in reference to it. The West must be cured of the dangerous illusion that a total threat can be defeated with partial measures. It must realize, and act on the realization, that Soviet communism in all its manifestations—as a political and military power, as a militant social religion, as a method and movement to overthrow the existing order—must be opposed with the appropriate armaments and defenses.

How shortsighted were the peoples of the West, in Europe as in America, when they rashly concluded from all the talk about "coexistence" that they would now be able to relax their military efforts, since the "peaceful competition" between communism and capitalism as proclaimed by Moscow would concentrate primarily in economic and social fields! How wrong was the opinion that it was no longer necessary to match Russia's armaments in the field of conventional weapons, since any future war would be an atomic war! *Hungary's tragedy, in which the "nuclear stalemate" between the big powers made an effective Western counteraction impossible, contains an urgent lesson for all those politicians who in the past few years seized on every reason and pretext to delay or reduce the armaments previously considered indispensable.*

What did they think when Bulganin

boastfully asserted that the Soviets would be able to overrun Europe without employing any nuclear weapons? What about those who, by constantly complaining about the burden of armaments and clamoring for more and more social benefits, have given rise to the illusion that Russian tanks could be stopped by the waving of social security cards? What did they think when they heard about the Russian tanks turning up in Hungary? Has it become clear now that armaments, social reform, and measures for the protection of the state are not alternatives to choose from, but that all of them are equally necessary for the defense against communism and must add up to a whole?

The threat of totalitarianism is "the burden of our time," as Hannah Arendt put it in the title of her grimly revealing and deeply disturbing book. It is not easy and it is not pleasant to have to live in a sort of companionship, actually, and for an indefinite time, with this continuous threat. But by assuming the burden consciously and courageously we can save ourselves from the worst, which would be to yield to the most terrible challenge of our time without putting up an honorable fight to the finish. "One need not hope in order to act, nor succeed in order to persevere" —these words of William of Orange may well hold a message for us at this portentous hour.

---

**You share with those of us in the Armed Forces an important task—the task of protecting and preserving the fundamental beliefs and institutions of the United States—beliefs and institutions which are so sacred to us that we declare them to be self-evident.**

**Frankly, I get the feeling that we sometimes are not doing as well as we think we are, or as we should be. We seem unable, or too lazy, to do enough to explain, teach, and most of all—demonstrate publicly before the world the fundamental, basic facts of liberty.**

**For example, here at home too many young men come into the Armed Forces with too little understanding of their responsibilities for citizenship. There are too many who are apathetic toward responsibility and complacent about the long-term continuance of their society.**

**We who are free must face up to our responsibilities in this battle for men's minds. We must know and understand what liberty means, and be convinced that it represents the best way of life in today's world. More than this—much more than this—we must be able to demonstrate this conviction to others. The force of example is more eloquent than words.**

*Admiral Arthur Radford*